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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Singapore's current energy policy and addresses how it is 
helping the country achieve greater energy security. Using a strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis approach, the three energy sub-sectors of 
hydrocarbons, nuclear energy, and renewables are evaluated to determine how 
Singapore’s core policy complements its energy security ambitions. The thesis concludes 
that Singapore need not possess a large endowment of domestic energy resources to 
enhance its energy security, as this can be achieved through partnership with international 
players, a whole-of-government approach, technical innovation, and perseverance in 
bridging the energy gap. With regard to the increasingly competitive international energy 
environment, Singapore need not take drastic measures to modify its current energy 
framework. Despite its lack of indigenous natural resources, Singapore will survive in a 
world of heightened energy demands by focusing on managing its foreign 
relations, because the future of energy security depends on positive ties between 
countries that participate in the global energy system. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Singapore is a geographically small country with limited natural and energy 
resources. As such, Singapore depends on foreign supplies of oil and natural gas to meet 
its domestic energy requirements, which exposes the energy industry to supply chain 
disruptions. Between 2007 and 2010, the Singapore government published three major 
documents outlining its vision and strategy on the growing energy challenge. Within these 
documents, the government identifies energy diversification as one key strategy to help 
achieve the country’s overarching objectives of economic competitiveness, energy 
security, and environmental sustainability.1 Considering the three major energy subsectors 
of hydrocarbons, nuclear power, and renewables, in what way is Singapore’s current 
energy strategy helping the country achieve greater energy security? How might Singapore 
modify its energy policy given that international competition for energy sources has 
intensified? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since its independence, Singapore owes much of its meteoric economic growth to 
the energy industry. Over the past 50 years, the country has invested in oil refineries, 
petrochemical plants, marine bunkers and storage facilities, and continues to attract foreign 
investors due to its strategic location astride the oil trade route in Southeast Asia. Despite 
its lack of domestic energy resources, Singapore successfully secures adequate energy 
supplies to support its highly urbanized population. Even more impressive, the country has 
learned to transform its resource deficiencies into business opportunities and thereby made 
its economy one of the strongest in the region.  
Singapore’s past 50 years of affluence, however, do not guarantee that it will reap 
the same dividends in the future. Concepts such as peak oil—the idea that the world’s 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report” (Singapore 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2007), 5. 
2 
oilfields will soon reach a maximum rate of extraction—and the susceptibility of energy 
supplies to natural disasters, sabotage, terrorism, embargoes, and political conflict all 
threaten the survival of any country relying on fossil fuels as their main source of energy. 
Therefore, the Singapore government must assess its current energy policy against the 
country’s capability and strategy to achieve their goals of energy independence. 
Significantly for a nation with no indigenous energy supplies, matching strategy with 
policy prevents wasted human capital and financial resources. 
In addition, Singapore should observe the trends and study the implications of the 
intensifying global competition for natural resources to secure the future of its own energy 
supply. A small city-state like Singapore does not have enough political influence and 
leverage to use during an energy crisis. Therefore, Singapore’s planners and policymakers 
need to draft strategies that will keep the country ahead of the global energy competition. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Between 2007 and 2010, the Singapore government published three major 
documents outlining its vision and strategy on the growing energy challenge: the first, 
known as the National Energy Policy Report (NEPR), was released in October 2007 and 
calls for a holistic approach that balances the overarching objectives of economic 
competitiveness, energy security, and environmental sustainability.2 This approach reflects 
Singapore’s understanding of the energy trilemma, a concept introduced by the World 
Energy Council that defines energy independence according to the “three core dimensions 
—Energy Security, Energy Equity, and Environmental Sustainability.”3 Authored by the 
Energy Policy Group (EPG) under the leadership of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI), the NEPR outlines hard targets for Singapore’s energy industry to increase its 
value-add from “$20 billion to around $34 billion by 2015, and to triple the employment 
generated from 5,700 to 15,300.”4 
                                                 
2 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report,” 5. 
3 World Energy Council, “World Energy Trilemma Index 2018” (United Kingdom, 2018), 9, 
https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/World-Energy-Trilemma-Index-2018.pdf. 
4 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report,” 8. 
3 
In April 2009, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Sustainable Development 
(IMCSD), the Ministry of National Development, and the Ministry of Environment and 
Water Resources (MEWR) released its strategy for sustainable development. The 
Sustainable Development Report revises the NEPR’s employment and value-add hard 
targets to 18,000 jobs and US$2.5 billion.5 At the same time, the MEWR formulated its 
definition of sustainable development as advancing the economy in an efficient, clean, and 
green way by utilizing fewer resources, minimizing waste production, and preserving 
natural heritage. A year later, the government fine-tuned the existing energy strategy in a 
document released by the Economic Strategies Committee (ESC) under the leadership of 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF).6 The Smart Energy Economy Report recommended 
measures for Singapore to become energy resilient, sustainable, and innovative, with a 
particular focus on technology to help overcome its energy challenges. 
Despite Singapore’s cognizance of the energy trilemma and the government’s 
three-pronged approach to addressing the country’s energy challenges, some believe that 
Singapore’s overall energy framework is in fact one-dimensional. Ng, for instance, argues 
that where energy is concerned, Singapore is pre-occupied with obtaining supplies cheaply 
to sustain its long-term economic growth.7 She further claims, “The ethical, ecological, 
social and environmental dimensions of a truly holistic policy are not found in the 
documents.”8 Similarly, Youngho and Putra believe that unlike most nations, Singapore’s 
energy policy emphasizes economic development and advocates for the transformation of 
resource deficiencies into profitable opportunities.9 All these critics seem to agree on the 
                                                 
5 Weng Hoong Ng, Singapore, the Energy Economy (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2012), 218. 
Note: This document was updated in 2015, but with no reference to the employment and value-add targets 
stated in the initial policy. 
6 Kwong Hwa Jen and S Iswaran, “ESC Subcommittee on Ensuring Energy Resilience and Sustainable 
Growth” (Economic Strategies Committee, February 2010), 84, 
https://www.mof.gov.sg/Portals/0/MOF%20For/Businesses/ESC%20Recommendations/Subcommittee%20
on%20Ensuring%20Energy%20Resilience%20and%20Sustainable%20Growth.pdf. 
7 Ng, Singapore, the Energy Economy, 3. 
8 Ng, 219. 
9 Chang Youngho and Nur Azha Putra, “Energy Security in Singapore: Challenges and Opportunities,” 
Nanyang Technological University Singapore, accessed August 2, 2019, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/nts/1121-energy-security-in-singapore/#.XUSSjZNKj-Z. 
4 
same observation—in terms of managing the energy trilemma, Singapore prioritizes its 
economic performance over energy security and environmental sustainability.   
There is some veracity to their critique as Singapore’s governmental determination 
and actions have led to various economic achievements in the energy sector. To illustrate, 
Singapore is a major crude oil refiner with a daily production capacity of 1.3 million 
barrels; most of Singapore’s oil refineries are running at full capacity, designed to refine 
crude oil from the Middle East.10 Singapore is also the world’s leading bunkering port, 
supplying 40.6 million tonnes of fuel to ships and exceeding US$20 billion in bunker sales 
in 2010.11 In addition, Singapore is the world’s third-largest oil trading center, and its 
physical oil trade reached US$188 billion in 2004, equivalent to about 20 percent of the 
global oil business.12  
Others believe that despite Singapore’s economics-driven energy policy, Singapore 
has performed strongly in the area of environmental sustainability. For example, Singapore 
is recognized as Asia’s greenest city despite its highly urbanized and dense population, 
partly owing to its national policies and the government’s ability to execute and enforce 
those regulations and standards.13 Likewise, academics and urban environmental 
sustainability experts have praised Singapore’s green growth track record, naming 
Singapore as a best practice case study in Asia and abroad.14 Tan argues: 
For Singapore, it was never a case of pursuing growth at all costs and 
cleaning up afterwards. Investing in the environment continues to be of high 
priority today…[t]he Singapore Government has always made clear to the 
                                                 
10 Mark Hong, “Overview of Singapore’s Energy Situation,” in Energy Perspectives on Singapore and 
the Region (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2017), 2–3. 
11 Ng, Singapore, the Energy Economy, 159. 
12 Hong, “Overview of Singapore’s Energy Situation,” 3. 
13 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Asian Green City Index: Assessing the Environmental Performance of 
Asia’s Major Cities” (Siemens, 2011), 10, http://sg.siemens.com/city_of_the_future/_docs/Asian-Green-
City-Index.pdf. 
14 Economist Intelligence Unit, 12; Peter Newman, “Green Urbanism and Its Application to 
Singapore,” Environment and Urbanization Asia 1, no. 2 (2010): 149, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/097542531000100204; Puay Yok Tan, James Wang, and Angelia Sia, “Perspectives 
on Five Decades of Urban Greening in Singapore,” Cities 32 (June 2013): 24. 
5 
public the national priority placed on the environment so that its vision for 
the environment can be shared and supported by everyone.15 
While varied opinions exist on the Singapore’s energy policy, most literature 
acknowledges that Singapore is nowhere near the world’s top performers in terms of energy 
security. In a study of 21 APEC economies by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Center, 
Singapore’s energy security proved disappointing relative to the country’s economic 
sophistication.16 Another study by Sovacool compared 18 countries from 1990 to 2010 
and Singapore ranked seventh out of 18 economies in terms of energy security 
performance.17 The study by the World Economic Forum ranked Singapore 39th among 
the 127 countries surveyed in terms of progress in achieving energy security while 
balancing economic growth and environmental sustainability.18 No matter which 
framework or indicators are used, Singapore’s energy security has often been identified as 
the area that requires improvement. 
The complex relationship between energy security, energy equity, and 
environmental sustainability is best illustrated by the Energy Trilemma Index in Figure 1. 
This scorecard shows that over the years, Singapore has consistently performed well in the 
realms of energy equity and environmental sustainability, but has slipped in the domain of 
energy security. Furthermore, this scorecard indicates that trade-offs occur between 
policies and strategies that are effective along one dimension but have adverse impacts on 
the other two. 
                                                 
15 Yong Soon Tan, Clean, Green and Blue: Singapore’s Journey Towards Environmental and Water 
Sustainability (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 6. 
16 Alicia Aponte et al., A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century (Tokyo, Japan: Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Centre, 2007), 
https://aperc.or.jp/file/2010/9/26/APERC_2007_A_Quest_for_Energy_Security.pdf. 
17 Benjamin K Sovacool, “An International Assessment of Energy Security Performance,” Ecological 
Economics 88 (April 2013): 148. 
18 World Economic Forum, “Energy Architecture Performance Index” (Geneva, Switzerland: World 
Economic Forum, 2017), http://wef.ch/2jkV5HX. 
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Figure 1. Energy Trilemma Index of Singapore, 2016–2018.19 
Daniel Yergin identifies diversification of energy resources as a step toward greater 
security and energy independence: multiplying supply sources limit the effects of 
disruption from a given source by providing viable alternatives.20 By being highly 
dependent on imported fuels, Singapore is exposed to both supply and price risks. For 
instance, geopolitical conflict, terrorism, and natural disasters can lead to energy supply 
disruption. Consequently, oil and gas prices may rise, which can undermine Singapore’s 
economic competitiveness. 
The Singapore government acknowledges the benefit of spreading risks by tapping 
multiple sources of energy; therefore, all the energy policy documents identify 
diversification as a key strategy for enhancing energy security.21 However, expansion of 
the fuel mix poses geographical, technological, and practical challenges for Singapore. For 
example, the national energy policy states that alternative sources of energy such as hydro, 
                                                 
19 Source: World Energy Council, “Energy Trilemma Country Profile: Singapore,” World Energy, 
accessed August 7, 2019, https://trilemma.worldenergy.org/#!/country-
profile?country=Singapore&year=2018. 
20 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 69–82, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20031912. 
21 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report,” 31; Jen and 
Iswaran, “ESC Subcommittee on Ensuring Energy Resilience and Sustainable Growth,” 86; Ministry of 





geothermal, wind power, and nuclear energy are not available in Singapore due to the 
country’s dense and urban landscape. Solar power is encouraged, but is costly compared 
to conventionally-produced electricity. Energy from coal has potential but faces 
environmental and health concerns.22 Nevertheless, Singapore remains optimistic 
regarding diversification away from oil and gas sources. The NEPR articulates, “we should 
keep all energy options on the table. As technology improves, energy sources which are 
not feasible for Singapore today may become viable in the future.”23 
Accordingly, the potential areas in which Singapore can expand its domestic energy 
production and enhance energy independence can be divided into three subsectors: 
hydrocarbons, nuclear, and renewables. Hydrocarbon fuels include oil, natural gas, and 
coal. In 2017, Singapore’s fuel mix consisted of natural gas (95.2%), petroleum (0.7%), 
coal (1.3%), and other energy products such as solar, waste, and biomass (2.9%).24 
Although dependence on fuel oil for electricity generation has declined over the years, 
Singapore’s fuel composition lacks the diversity seen in the global energy landscape. 
As the most urbanized country in Southeast Asia, Singapore is expected to consume 
increased amounts of energy in the future. Thus, the Energy Market Authority (EMA) 
projects a continued heavy reliance on natural gas to meet the increasing electricity 
demand.25 In 2013, Singapore opened its first liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal to 
import natural gas from different sources around the world. This project was a strategic 
move away from dependence on gas pipelines coming from Malaysia and Indonesia.26 
Although LNG supports the fuel diversification strategy, it does not reduce the reliance on 
                                                 
22 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report,” 7. 
23 Ministry of Trade and Industry, 32. 
24 Energy Market Authority, “Singapore Energy Statistics 2018,” 2018, 14, 
https://www.ema.gov.sg/cmsmedia/Publications_and_Statistics/Publications/SES18/Publication_Singapore
_Energy_Statistics_2018.pdf. 
25 Energy Market Authority, “Preparing for Future Power Generation Investments in Singapore,” 
December 21, 2015, 9, 
https://www.ema.gov.sg/cmsmedia/Consultations/Electricity/Consultation%20Paper%20-
%20Preparing_for_Future_Power_Generation_Investments_in_Singapore.pdf. 




hydrocarbons as the primary energy source for the power sector. Even former Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew was less optimistic regarding the expansion of the fuel mix when 
he stated, “Singapore would never become fully energy-independent, and it would never 
be able to generate enough energy from renewable sources like solar or wind to power its 
economy.”27 
Some have proposed nuclear power as a future energy source to mitigate the effects 
of global warming and the rising oil, gas, and coal prices. One particular appeal of this 
technology is that the fission process does not release CO2 to the atmosphere, making 
nuclear power a low-carbon energy source. In addition, nuclear power can be cost-
competitive in the long run despite its higher upfront costs.28 In 2010, the ESC 
recommended nuclear research to begin immediately as “the process of developing nuclear 
energy, if deemed feasible, is likely to take at least 15 years.”29 Following this 
recommendation, the MTI conducted a feasibility study to examine the safety, technical, 
and economic viability of nuclear technology.30 The study determined that the introduction 
of nuclear energy in Singapore is not yet advisable due to the safety and security risks it 
presented to its dense urban population. 
Meanwhile, other scientists and engineers have shifted the dialogue from whether 
Singapore should consider nuclear power, to instead consider where it should establish its 
new energy source. For example, Palmer et al. advocate for an underground nuclear power 
station because it minimizes the risks of a nuclear accident and risks associated with the 
theft, smuggling, and misuse of nuclear substances.31 Buongiorno et al. suggest an offshore 
floating nuclear plant because it eliminates the threat of earthquakes and tsunamis and does 
                                                 
27 Ng, Singapore, the Energy Economy, 219. 
28 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Energy for Growth: National Energy Policy Report,” 32. 
29 Ng, Singapore, the Energy Economy, 127. 
30 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Factsheet Nuclear Energy Pre-Feasibility Study,” 2012, 1, 
https://www.mti.gov.sg/-/media/MTI/Newsroom/Parliament-QandAs/2012/10/Second-Minister-S-
Iswarans-reply-to-Parliament-Questions-on-nuclear-energy-pre-feasibility-study-in-/pre-fs-factsheet.pdf. 
31 Andrew Palmer, Seeram Ramakrishna, and Hassan Muzaffar Cheema, “Nuclear Power in 
Singapore,” The IES Journal Part A: Civil & Structural Engineering 3, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 68, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19373260903343449. 
9 
not commit the country to a long-term project unlike indigenous nuclear infrastructures.32 
Amidst this unsettled debate, Singapore is not ruling out nuclear power as a possible source 
of energy for the small island-nation. In 2014, the government announced that it will bolster 
its nuclear technology expertise by launching a Nuclear Research and Education 
Programme with the oversight of the National Research Foundation.33 The initiative was 
granted an initial budget of US$63 million with the objective of developing a community 
of nuclear experts and capabilities in nuclear safety, science, and engineering. 
In an effort to further diversify its energy mix and to address the issue of 
environmental sustainability, Singapore began promoting the renewable energy sector after 
acceding to the Kyoto Protocol, which it signed in July 2006. However, some analysts are 
doubtful regarding the renewable energy plan. For instance, Ng points out that “the 
government has launched several ambitious initiatives all at the same time that demand 
detailed and intricate coordination across various agencies.”34 Hamilton-Hart writes, “I 
have not found a single policy target or statement by MEWR or the NEA that targets 
absolute cuts in Singapore’s emissions.”35 The National Climate Change Secretariat 
(NCCS) claims there are limits to how much more the country can reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions, given that Singapore has already shifted 95% of its fuel mix to natural gas, 
which is a cleaner form of fossil fuel compared to coal and oil.36 
Despite the claims by the NCCS, Singapore continues to tap renewable sources of 
energy to improve its energy security. For example, large-scale solar photovoltaic panels 
are being installed nationwide, with the goal of providing 350 megawatts peak (MWp) of 
                                                 
32 J Buongiorno et al., “The Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant Concept: Nuclear Technology: Vol 194, 
No 1,” Nuclear Technology 194, no. 1 (2016): 1, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.13182/NT15-
49?src=recsys. 
33 Lui Pao Chuen, “Singapore Nuclear Safety Research and Education Programme” (Da Nang, 
Vietnam, August 5, 2015), 1–2, 
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/47/065/47065306.pdf?r=1&r=1. 
34 Ng, Singapore, the Energy Economy, 180. 
35 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Singapore’s Climate Change Policy,” Innovation: The Singapore 
Magazine of Research, Technology, and Education, accessed August 16, 2019, 
https://www.innovationmagazine.com/volumes/v9n1/coverstory4.html. 
36 National Climate Change Secretariat, “Reducing Emissions,” accessed August 16, 2019, 
https://www.nccs.gov.sg/climate-change-and-singapore/reducing-emissions/reducing-emissions. 
10 
electricity by 2020.37 For the long term, Singapore is looking into solar energy supplied 
from Australia via undersea cables. The project can potentially provide three gigawatts of 
electricity, or one-fifth of Singapore’s electricity demand.38 Biomass represents another 
alternative energy source for Singapore, wherein solid waste is directed to waste-to-energy 
plants for incineration. Steam produced from incinerable waste runs turbine generators, 
which in turn produce electricity.39 
Energy diversification options are limited for a resource-constrained economy like 
Singapore, and this limitation complicates energy policy formulation. This thesis assesses 
the applicability of Singapore’s energy framework in achieving energy security and 
addresses how Singapore could adapt to the world’s increasing competition for natural 
resources while managing the energy trilemma. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major issue addressed by this thesis is Singapore’s current energy policy and 
how it is helping the country achieve greater energy independence, particularly given the 
intensifying international competition for energy sources. Building on the available 
literature presented in the previous section, this thesis advances two hypotheses related to 
the research question. 
First, I hypothesize that Singapore’s collective energy policy and strategy are 
complementary and coincide with the country’s overall energy security goals. This 
hypothesis is based on the observation that despite indigenous resource constraints and 
geographic limitations, Singapore continues to innovate and successfully invest in 
alternative sources of energy to improve its fuel mix. For example, the country’s push for 
solar energy to reach up to 20% of electricity generation by utilizing water reservoirs as 
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additional locations for solar panel installation and by collaborating with Australia for a 
transoceanic solar energy supply indicates a strong commitment to energy diversification 
by transitioning away from fossil fuels. 
Second, I hypothesize that although Singapore is on track to obtaining energy 
security through diversification, there are areas for improvement in the country’s energy 
policy that may reduce volatility in foreign oil and natural gas supplies to a tolerable level 
roughly half of the current. Foreign energy resources reflect much volatility, and a country 
that imports almost 100% of its energy resources needs to understand the impact of regional 
tensions, energy competition, natural disasters, and embargoes on its energy portfolio. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis adopts the research design of John Steiner, a former student at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and author of the graduate thesis “Energy Security in Jordan.”40 To answer 
the research question, this thesis accomplishes the following three tasks. First, it establishes the 
overall energy policy and strategy of the government of Singapore. Second, it evaluates whether 
the national policy and strategy complement the country’s energy security ambitions. Finally, it 
identifies potential areas for improvement and offers recommendations on how Singapore could 
respond to the intensifying global demand for natural resources.  
To meet the first goal, the thesis draws from a variety of sources to establish 
Singapore’s overall energy strategy and policy. The researcher proposes that taking 
Singapore’s core policy document at face value risks overlooking the country’s whole-of-
government approach and the changes made to policy and legislation since the initial 
national energy framework was published in 2007. For instance, Singapore initially ruled 
out nuclear power as an alternative energy source due to the risks associated with the 
country’s limited land area and high population density. However, this decision was 
retracted when the government announced that it will bolster its nuclear technology 
expertise by launching a Nuclear Research and Education Programme in 2014. This 
deviation from the original energy framework is not captured through a written policy 
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update. Therefore, Singapore’s collective energy strategy must be ascertained as it stands 
today, based on the government’s official documents, unstated policies, and actions. This 
thesis also consults scholarly journals, books, analysis by international agencies, press 
releases and news reports. 
Next, to evaluate the effectiveness of Singapore’s energy framework and to offer 
useful recommendations on how it may respond to the increasing energy competition, this 
thesis adopts a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis 
approach. Singapore is examined as a single case study, but the three energy subsectors of 
hydrocarbons, nuclear, and renewables are considered individually. This thesis includes a 
discussion of the economic and political implications for Singapore related to each fuel 
source to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy objectives. 
Singapore was chosen as a topic for energy security despite its lack of indigenous 
natural resources, because its innovative thinking has allowed it to carefully manage the 
energy trilemma, making it the number one country in Asia in terms of achieving a well-
balanced energy system. In addition, the Singapore case illustrates that a nation can thrive 
under very limited resources and can become one of the world’s most successful nations. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This chapter provided background on Singapore’s energy policy framework and 
varying perspectives on the government’s approach to the energy trilemma. The remainder 
of this thesis is divided into three energy subsectors. Chapter II covers hydrocarbons, 
starting with oil as the foundation for Singapore’s petrochemical sector. Next, it focuses 
on the country’s recent shift from petroleum to natural gas for electricity generation. 
Chapter III discusses the prospect of nuclear power as an alternative energy source and 
related issues, such as the economics of the technology and threats to society. Chapter IV 
explores the status of renewable energy in Singapore’s fuel mix. Finally, Chapter V 
synthesizes the findings from the previous chapters to assess how Singapore’s energy 
policy is helping the country achieve greater energy security, while offering 





Singapore’s energy landscape has transformed dramatically since the pre-British 
Empire era. From a sleepy fishing village relying on oil lamps and wood, the country 
transitioned to coal power stations in the early 1900s, to the more advanced technology of 
today such as combined-cycle gas turbine plants (CCGTs), solar modules, and alternative 
fuels for transportation.41 
Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister, the 
country began its rapid urbanization and infrastructure construction in the 1960s. One of 
the hallmarks of that period was the government’s judgment to prioritize electricity 
distribution to businesses over households due to limited funding and lack of indigenous 
energy resources.42 The rationale was simple: electricity was not essential for households 
that had alternative means of survival through charcoal and gas. On the other hand, 
bringing electricity to the industry would increase investment, production and jobs, 
therefore improving the overall quality of life of Singaporeans.43 By embracing pragmatic 
policies, Singapore was able to overcome its resource disadvantages and become one of 
the world’s fastest-growing economies. 
Despite its energy innovations and policies, Singapore remains dependent on 
imports of carbon-based fuels to meet the country’s rising energy demand. As illustrated 
in Figure 2, about 95% of Singapore’s electricity in 2019 came from natural gas and around 
2% from coal and petroleum. Natural gas is mainly supplied through pipelines from 
Malaysia and Indonesia, whereas crude oil is mostly imported from the Middle East.44 This 
heavy reliance on hydrocarbons as a fuel source is problematic on two fronts. First, the 
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lack of diversification makes Singapore vulnerable to a number of supply and price risks 
such as geopolitical conflict, social unrest, accidents, and natural disasters. As a result, 
insufficient investments in the production capacity of supplier countries can threaten the 
stability of energy supplies.45 
 
Figure 2. Singapore Fuel Mix for Electricity Generation, 1st Quarter 2019.46 
Second, hydrocarbons threaten the environment through greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, primarily from the burning of fossil fuels. The global concentration of carbon 
dioxide in 2018 was 407.4 parts per million, the maximum amount ever recorded in 
history.47 For Singapore, GHG emissions are projected to continue rising steadily due to 
the country’s economic trajectory and an energy sector that the chemical, petrochemical, 
and oil refining industries heavily influence.48 If energy demand continues to be met 
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mostly with fossil fuels, GHG emissions will continue to raise global temperatures and sea 
levels, resulting in devastating physical, economic, and social impact. 
While risks of supply disruption and the growing environmental crisis call for a 
switch to alternative sources of energy, a complete substitution of hydrocarbons with 
renewables and nuclear energy is highly unlikely for a country with a long history of 
involvement in the oil industry. To illustrate, Singapore owes much of its prosperity to 
early investments in the oil subsector such as refineries, petrochemical plants, shipyards, 
storage terminals, oil rigs, offshore vessels, and equipment.49 Singapore also played a vital 
role in the late nineteenth-century growth of major multi-national gas and oil companies, 
including ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, and British Petroleum.50 At present, Singapore has 
three world-scale refineries, a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal, one of the world’s 
largest oil and gas trading ports, nearly a hundred oil, gas, petrochemicals and specialty 
chemicals companies from the around the world, and holds 70% of the global market for 
oil rig building.51 Singapore’s economy is in many ways tied to the hydrocarbon industry; 
therefore, a divorce from this enterprise is implausible in the immediate future. 
With these developments in mind, what policy options exist for “the country that 
oil built” to mitigate the negative impacts of supply disruption and climate change? In light 
of the importance of oil to Singapore’s modern development, and the requisite management 
of the energy trilemma going forward, the country is pushing for policy initiatives that are 
beyond fuel diversification alone. 
B. AMBITIONS 
The Singapore government’s policies on energy and climate change are 
encompassed in three national reports. The first document—the National Energy Policy 
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Report (NEPR), published in 2007—outlines six strategies to balance Singapore’s policy 
objectives of economic competitiveness, energy security, and environmental 
sustainability.52 In 2009, the government released the second document—the Sustainable 
Development Report—that featured seventeen goals for 2030, ranging from the elimination 
of poverty to the strengthening of global partnerships for sustainable development.53 A 
year later, in a third document, the government fine-tuned the existing energy strategy 
through the Smart Energy Economy Report which identified five key strategies to achieve 
the national energy objectives.54 
Given the importance of hydrocarbons in Singapore’s modern development as 
established in the previous section, it is not surprising that none of the energy policy 
documents provide specific goals regarding hydrocarbon reduction for domestic 
consumption. The three major documents published between 2007 and 2010 offer no target 
numbers nor a timeline for scaling down on the country’s reliance on hydrocarbon 
products. The closest to a hard target appears in the annex of the Sustainable Development 
Report as follows: “By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the 
global energy mix.”55 Thus, one needs to look beyond Singapore’s core policy documents 
to paint an accurate picture of the government’s ambitions. 
Singapore has committed to major international organizations to reduce GHG 
emissions in an effort to combat climate change. A summary of Singapore’s pledges and 
targets compiled by Climate Action Tracker is provided in Table 1. However, expert 
analysis on Singapore’s commitments is rather pessimistic. According to Climate 
Analytics and New Climate Institute, 
Despite its high economic capacity, Singapore has a very weak climate 
target, which we rate as “highly insufficient,” and is likely to over-achieve 
it without implementing any additional policies. Singapore needs to 
substantially strengthen its target. While renewable energy capacity has 
expanded, gas remains the dominant energy source in the power sector…no 
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clear policy signal to avoid locking in this carbon-intensive form of energy. 
Singapore started implementing a carbon tax in 2019, but its main focus for 
climate mitigation is on energy efficiency programmes. This will not 
compensate for the increasing energy demand from the industry and 
buildings sectors, which will result in rising emissions.56 




Furthermore, as seen in Table 1, Singapore’s long-term commitments are non-
existent. Unlike the European Union, the United States, and some of Singapore’s Asian 
neighbors like Japan and Bhutan, Singapore has made no climate pledges and targets 
beyond 2030. Long-term goals shape the overall direction of any government or 
organization. In the energy and environmental sectors, long-term goals are “vital since 
current national climate plans are only sufficient enough to limit warming to 2.7-3.7 
degrees C (4.9-6.7 degrees F). Not only do long-term strategies present an opportunity to 
bring national action in line with needed ambition, they also encourage countries to avoid 
costly investments in the wrong technologies.”58 
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The next section explores how Singapore’s policies and actions address the three 
competing ends of the energy trilemma, focusing on the two main sources of hydrocarbon-
based energy: petroleum and natural gas. Coal will be excluded in this discussion because 
its contribution to Singapore’s overall energy mix is negligible. 
C. PETROLEUM 
The centrality of hydrocarbons in Singapore’s energy policy is first evident in the 
NEPR strategy of promoting a competitive energy market. Part of this plan is the opening 
of the petroleum refining, trading, and retailing industries to business competition, making 
Singapore the first country in Asia to liberalize the electricity market.59 On the positive 
side, the program enables businesses to set the price of electricity without subsidies, gives 
consumers a choice on the price plan that best meets their needs, raises economic growth 
potential, and encourages prudent usage of energy resources. On the negative side, the 
program compromises the broader energy security policy objectives when markets are 
unable to mitigate the negative impact of fossil fuels on the environment.60 The strategy 
of liberalizing the electricity market, therefore, presents an opportunity for Singapore to 
rectify market failures by imposing strict standards and regulations in the energy market. 
In 2001, Singapore established the Energy Market Authority (EMA) under the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) to secure a reliable energy supply, promote fair 
competition in the energy market while protecting consumer interests, and to foster a 
dynamic energy sector through innovation and leadership.61 As the energy industry 
developer and regulator, EMA rectifies the negative impact of fossil fuels through its 
“Smart Energy” and “Sustainable Future” initiatives.62 
Singapore has also undertaken a whole-of-government approach involving 
different sectors and industries in formulating its energy policy. The integrated strategy of 
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dealing with energy and climate change is led by the Energy Policy Group (EPG) 
established in 2006.63 Members of the EPG include the MTI, EMA, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Ministry 
of Transport, and Agency for Science, Technology and Research, to name a few.64 By 
bringing together various ministries and agencies, Singapore is better able to formulate 
solutions to a wide range of complex energy-related issues. 
Another mechanism toward promoting a competitive market is Singapore’s goal of 
securing its position as Asia’s premier energy trading hub, a game plan that likewise 
involves continued reliance on hydrocarbons. To this end, Singapore’s strategy is to build 
the energy industry by increasing the country’s investment and output in the oil refining 
sector.65 According to NEPR, Singapore will benefit economically from increasing its 
present refined oil production of 1.3 million barrels per day due to the growing demand in 
Asia. But without domestic energy resources, from which countries does Singapore procure 
oil? As shown in Figure 3, about 60% of Singapore’s crude oil imports came from the 
Middle East, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This is not surprising 
since a majority of the world’s proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East. In effect, 
any major disruption in the fuel supply from the Middle East greatly upsets Singapore’s 
petroleum industry. 
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Figure 3. Singapore Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2012.66 
Singapore’s oil refining industry traces back to the country’s independence from 
British rule and is considered the launchpad of “Singapore’s economic miracle.”67 The 
industry brought heavy industrialization investments from the West, bolstered the 
credibility of the young nation and “lifted Singapore’s standing in the eyes of the United 
States, Europe and Japan, then the world’s most important powers.”68 Furthermore, 
Singapore’s maritime trade and port traffic increased due to the development of oil 
refineries. Similarly, the refineries attracted investments from other industries, such as 
finance and banking, engineering, fuel storage and distribution, resulting in the growth of 
these sectors along with the expansion of the refining centers.69 
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Most accounts of Singapore’s transition from Third World poverty to an affluent 
modern city-state do not give credit to how Singapore built its oil refining industry in record 
time. The country did not have a refinery in 1960, but by 1974 it had five operating 
refineries, giving Singapore the title of “Houston of Asia” because of its “petroleum-related 
activities [that] placed the country at the heart of the Pacific Basin’s energy economy.”70  
Aside from its strategic location at the Strait of Malacca that accelerated the venture 
of major oil companies in the newly independent nation-state, oil refining succeeded in 
Singapore due to three factors: timing, liberality, and demand. According to Ng, Singapore 
at that time did not have competition from other countries and therefore enjoyed a first-
mover advantage.71 Second, Singapore took a less nationalistic approach and gave foreign 
companies complete ownership and control of their investments.72 Third, the conflicts in 
Asia and the Middle East demanded fuel for military operations, which helped Singapore 
tighten its grip on the oil supply chain.73  
Singapore’s oil refining industry continued to develop over the next few decades, 
allowing the country to stay ahead of the competition. In the 1990s, Singapore started 
facing threats to its oil export economy. South Korea surpassed Singapore’s oil production 
by more than twice Singapore’s capacity, as Seoul supplied China’s rapidly growing 
market.74 By 1996, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and the Philippines had 
increased their refined oil output by 10% to rely less on imports.75 At the turn of the 
century, India, China, and the Middle East launched aggressive expansion programs to 
build more sophisticated refineries.76 Today, it is against this competitive environment that 
the Singapore government strives to secure the country’s position as Asia’s premier refined 
oil trading hub by expanding and upgrading its existing refineries. 
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Given Singapore’s land constraints and small domestic market for oil, is it worth 
investing billions of dollars to build larger and more complex refineries? According to the 
consulting firm Purvin & Gertz, worldwide refineries are projected to cost US$205 billion 
to expand, upgrade, and maintain the facilities through 2015.77 The firm expects this figure 
to decrease to US$110 billion through 2025. Ng attributes the forecasted slowdown in 
refining investments to poor margins, weakening demand from developing countries, rising 
energy conservation efforts, and the easy supply of cheap crude oil.78 Moreover, Purvin & 
Gertz notes that the global increase in refining capacity and the slowing demand for refined 
oil has created a near-term oversupply, putting the weaker refineries at risk of shutting 
down.79 The volatility in the oil refining industry therefore presents a risk not only to 
Singapore’s economy but also to its long-term energy security. 
To mitigate the risks to economic growth and increase the value of existing oil 
refineries, Singapore introduced petrochemical investments into the energy sector. In 2010 
and 2012, Shell and ExxonMobil built petrochemical facilities on Jurong Island which 
allowed three of Singapore’s oil refiners to serve as feedstock suppliers and less as fuel 
suppliers.80 To date, Jurong Island has employed over 25,000 personnel, attracted the 
major operations of over 100 global chemical firms, and drawn fixed asset investments in 
excess of US$36 billion.81 
From an energy security perspective, disruptions in foreign petroleum supply are 
mitigated by initiatives to increase Singapore’s oil storage capacity. For example, the 
government invested US$758 million to develop the Jurong Rock Caverns, the first 
underground oil storage facility in Southeast Asia, capable of storing up to 9.2 million 
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barrels of liquid hydrocarbons.82 Moreover, Singapore’s other oil stockpiles are held by 
independent commercial terminals and private sector oil refiners, amounting to a total of 
126 million barrels of oil, and translating to around 300 days of emergency supply.83  
From an economic standpoint, Singapore’s large storage facilities aid the 
development of the Asian “spot market,” where a surplus of oil supply from the West 
arrives in Asia in search of new outlets.84 Hong writes: 
The presence of a large number of independent storage facilities has not 
only attracted the oil majors to Singapore but also independent trading 
houses. Independent storage facilities meant large trading houses could 
trade like the oil majors. They could now move oil across from various other 
locations, store, blend, and trade these products into the different parts of 
Asia.85 
Singapore’s storage facilities also enable trading houses to capture the “contango.”86 In 
commodities trading, contango occurs when the future price of an asset is higher than the 
current spot price.87 This concept allows trading houses to purchase relatively cheap oil, 
deposit in storage facilities, and sell to consuming centers for profit when spot prices 
increase.88 
To further mitigate the risks to energy security while promoting environmental 
sustainability, Singapore started replacing oil with natural gas in the electricity generation 
sector, resulting in less carbon-intensive fossil fuels and representing as much as 95% of the 
country’s current energy mix. The next section investigates Singapore’s use of natural gas. 
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D. NATURAL GAS 
The addition of natural gas to Singapore’s energy landscape is a more recent 
development compared to the long and established history of petroleum. Natural gas was 
first introduced in 1992 by Senoko Energy, Singapore’s largest power generation company, 
through pipelines running from Malaysia’s state oil and gas company Petronas.89 Senoko 
Energy’s environmental and commercial success paved the way for the rapid growth phase 
of Singapore’s natural gas industry, leading to more long-term contracts with the 
international market. In 2001, Singapore signed a US$9 billion contract with Indonesia to 
import piped natural gas (PNG) from Sumatra, marking the transition to a greener 
economy.90 
The rapid incorporation and importance of natural gas in Singapore’s energy 
landscape are evident when comparing Singapore’s fuel mix to the rest of the world. Figure 
4 shows that Singapore’s energy industry by 2013 was much less carbon-intensive 
compared to other nations that still used coal for electricity generation. Regardless of the 
statistics, Doshi views Singapore’s major transition to natural gas as long overdue because 
the world began turning away from oil in the 1970s as a result of the global oil price 
shocks.91 Despite the belated action, Singapore has outpaced most countries in quitting the 
coal industry and investing in more sustainable sources of energy. One notable 
achievement is that Singapore’s finance sector is moving away from funding coal-fired 
power plants in Asia, signaling that energy financing portfolios can contribute to meeting 
the country’s pledges on climate change.92 
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Figure 4. Fuel Mix for Power Generation by Country, 2013.93 
The switch to natural gas as a fuel source was an easy choice to make. For most of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the residents of Singapore were subject to the harmful effects of 
burning oil for electricity generation.94 Acid rain and air led to the corrosion of vehicles, 
in addition to the health and environmental consequences that became harder to ignore. 
Compared to petroleum, the burning of natural gas emits almost no particulates and little 
carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide, making it a more favorable option for electricity 
generation.95 In addition, Ng emphasizes that “while gas costs more than fuel oil on a 
calorific basis, it yields better economics because gas-fired combined-cycle plants are more 
efficient than oil-fired thermal plants.”96  
Despite the efficiency of natural gas for power generation, this energy source 
carries vulnerabilities in the long run. For example, in 2006, Singapore realized the 
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unreliability of Indonesia and Malaysia as long-term natural gas suppliers.97 Technological 
failures and geopolitical realities intervened, forcing Singapore to rethink its energy 
landscape. Between 2002 and 2004, Singapore experienced at least five power disruptions 
from the underwater pipeline system, causing businesses and residences to suffer 
significant losses.98 The vulnerability of the piped gas infrastructure was also revealed 
when Indonesian separatist forces threatened to shut down Exxon-Mobil’s gas production 
facilities in Sumatra.99 Similarly, intelligence gathered after the September 11, 2001 
bombing of the World Trade Center showed Al-Qaeda’s plans to target Singapore’s 
commercial and energy infrastructure.100 Although the Al-Qaeda plot was never carried 
out, the threat emphasized the importance of resource diversification to ensure the 
continuity of energy supply. 
Singapore’s pipeline gas supply and contracts with Malaysia and Indonesia are 
summarized in Table 2. In evaluating the evolution and trajectory of Singapore’s PNG 
industry, Doshi writes: 
The energy landscape in both Malaysia and Indonesia has changed since 
these contracts were signed. The lack of major discoveries and gas field 
developments has resulted in dwindling gas supplies relative to rapid 
domestic demand growth. Both countries have expressed concern over 
declining domestic gas production and their ability to meet rapidly growing 
domestic demand as well as servicing their export commitments…this 
caused considerable uncertainty over whether the existing contracts [with 
Singapore] would be renewed.101 
Indeed, domestic consumers in Malaysia and Indonesia threaten Singapore’s long-term 
PNG reserves. In 2006, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia announced a 
policy shift that limited Indonesia’s export of gas in favor of its domestic customers.102 As 
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a result, Singapore was forced to diversify beyond piped gas supplies and chose to invest 
in the LNG industry to open the country to a variety of international sources beyond Asia. 
Table 2. Singapore Pipeline Gas Supply and Contracts.103 
 
 
In contrast to PNG, LNG is gas cooled to negative 260 degrees Fahrenheit to 
transform into the liquid state, reducing the normal gas volume by 600 times and allowing 
efficient transport over long distances through specially insulated tankers.104 Once it 
reaches its final destination, LNG is warmed, re-gasified, and introduced to the gas network 
for distribution to end-users. 
Whereas Singapore previously imported all its natural gas through Indonesian and 
Malaysian pipelines, the opening of the first LNG terminal on Jurong Island in 2013 has 
allowed Singapore to tap the global gas market, particularly the United States and 
Australia.105 According to Singapore LNG Corporation chief executive John Ng, the 
terminal “now has enough capacity to meet the city-state’s total gas demand, even if it were 
to stop importing natural gas through pipes.”106 Singapore’s total natural gas demand in 
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2018 was nine million tonnes, well under the LNG terminal’s regasification capacity of 11 
million tonnes.107 
In the context of the energy trilemma, Singapore’s venture into the LNG industry 
seems like a winner in three dimensions. First, the addition of alternative sources of energy 
enhances energy security by reducing supply risks and enabling the government to meet 
current and future demands. Second, LNG promotes environmental sustainability because 
of its lower carbon footprint compared to other fossil fuels such as coal and petroleum. 
Third, in conjunction with Singapore’s liberalized electricity market, LNG enhances 
energy equity by making energy accessible and affordable across the population. Most of 
all, LNG advances Singapore’s ultimate objective of economic growth because the LNG 
industry promises profitable opportunities beyond refined oil trading. 
Singapore not only intends to meet its domestic energy needs but also to capitalize 
on the LNG infrastructure for industrial growth. Ng writes, “Singapore’s planners believe 
it is in a strong position to become an international LNG trading center through the use of 
the import terminal, pipeline and shipping infrastructure, financial system and strategic 
position between consumers in Northeast and South Asia, and suppliers from the Middle 
East, Russia, and Australia.”108 For example, the terminal can be used for storage and 
trading of LNG as well as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). It can also offer low-cost and 
low-carbon solutions for gas processing. Singapore is also exploring the feasibility of using 
LNG as bunker fuel for ships.109 
Certainly, Singapore is poised for economic success as the forecast for the LNG 
market is promising. According to a study released by Research and Markets: 
The market for LNG in Singapore is projected to grow at a [compound 
annual growth rate] of 10.39% during 2016–2021. Increasing demand for 
LNG from end-users, declining LNG prices, strategic geographical location 
in Asia-Pacific, and implementation of favorable government policies are a 
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few of the major factors expected to boost demand for LNG in 
Singapore.”110 
On the global scale, demand for LNG is expected to increase through 2040 particularly in 
Asia, as illustrated in Figure 5. As reported by S&P Global Platts Analytics, “75% of the 
world’s LNG demand growth to 2040 will come from Asia, against only 30% of supply 
growth in the energy-hungry continent over a comparable period.”111 Given this backdrop, 
Singapore can leverage its LNG technology and experience in oil trading to become Asia’s 
leading energy trading hub, helping Singapore pursue its ultimate ambition of sustained 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 5. LNG Demand Forecast for Asia.112 
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In reality, however, Singapore faces challenges as it drives toward LNG expansion. 
In the first place, issues of safety and security continue to haunt the Lion City, as it is 
located at the crossroads of the world’s most crucial shipping lanes. Transport of LNG 
involves slow-moving marine tankers passing through the busy Strait of Malacca, 
increasing the risk of accidents and terrorist attacks.113 Figure 6 illustrates the oil and LNG 
gas flows through the Strait of Malacca in a span of six years, reaching 16 million barrels 
per day. 
 
Figure 6. Oil and LNG Flows through the Strait of Malacca.114 
In 2010, an oil tanker and bulk carrier collided in the Strait of Singapore, spilling 
2,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea.115 Several other incidents have occurred resulting 
in oil spills despite Singapore’s best efforts to manage maritime traffic along its coasts. In 
addition, Singapore received warnings of terrorist attacks on oil tankers transiting the 
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Malacca Strait, similar to the threats to the piped gas infrastructure.116 Needless to say, the 
new stream of LNG tankers sailing through the primary chokepoint in Asia will require 
mariners with exceptional safety records complemented by tightened security measures of 
the Singapore Navy and Coast Guard.117 
A second challenge pertains to the sustainability of natural gas as an energy source. 
Natural gas was initially referred to as a “bridge fuel,” a fuel alternative that would help 
reduce GHG emissions until the world could totally rely on renewable energy sources.118 
But research shows that global temperatures will continue to rise even if natural gas were 
to dominate the electricity system. In one study, Howarth concludes that 
While it is true that less carbon dioxide is emitted per unit energy released 
when burning natural gas compared to coal or oil, natural gas is composed 
largely of methane, which itself is an extremely potent greenhouse gas. 
Methane is far more effective at trapping heat in the atmosphere than is 
carbon dioxide, and so even small rates of methane emission can have a 
large influence on the greenhouse gas footprints (GHGs) of natural gas 
use.119 
Potential leaks exist in the natural gas production process, from ground extraction to land 
or sea transportation. While an individual leak is insignificant, the build-up of droplets 
amounts to a substantial methane concentration in the atmosphere, especially considering 
the network of pipelines and transport vessels involved in the operational chain.120 
Third, there is the dilemma of oversupply, particularly influenced by the recent 
shale gas discoveries in Australia and the United States. Jaganathan reports, “The global 
LNG market is awash with new supply amid slowing demand in key countries such as 
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China and Japan, leaving some traders with cargoes they have bought but are unable to 
resell.”121 Energy companies are already seeing the effects of this trend. In November 
2019, a Singapore-based gas importer absorbed sunk costs for canceling the loading of 
LNG cargo from the United States.122 Natural gas is typically sold with “a liquefaction fee 
of between $3.00 to $3.50 per [millimeter British thermal units],” a price that traders still 
pay even if they decide to cancel purchases.123 If the oversupply situation persists in the 
next few years, Singapore might be better off delaying plans for new LNG projects or 
expansion to await better market conditions. 
Lastly, the biggest challenges for Singapore’s LNG industry are low liquidity and 
storage.124 According to S&P Global Platts, 
Low liquidity will continue to be the biggest challenge to Singapore’s hub 
ambitions, as the limited size of its domestic gas market relative to the 
volume of LNG traded in Asia (which accounts for three quarters of global 
demand) makes it difficult for the country to replicate the balancing role the 
bigger and interconnected European hubs play in the global LNG markets. 
The prospects of its storage and reload initiative may also be limited by the 
inefficient nature of LNG re-exports. Unlike oil, the cost of transporting and 
handling LNG relative to its market price is significant.125 
Natural gas storage in Singapore sells for US$2.5 million to US$6 million mmBtu per year, 
in addition to costs associated with reloading and re-export.126 This suggests that storage 
expenses may be worth as much as the price of gas itself. In addition, natural evaporation 
or “boil-off” changes the quality and volume of gas over time, precluding the long-term 
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storage of LNG.127 Taken together, these factors contribute to the waning appetite for LNG 
reloads. 
E. FINDINGS 
Singapore’s hydrocarbon industry vis-à-vis the energy trilemma is evaluated using 
a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis. The analysis is then 
used to derive policy implications and to recommend avenues for improving future 
performance. The SWOT analysis of the hydrocarbon energy framework is as follows: 
The strengths of the hydrocarbon industry are mainly the government’s strategic 
involvement in national energy issues, the promotion of a competitive energy market, its 
status as an oil refining hub, and the country’s switch to natural gas for electricity 
generation. Singapore should continue its whole-of-government approach to handle energy 
issues and maintain the competitive energy market to encourage prudent use of energy 
resources. Singapore should also use its expertise in oil trading and its skilled labor force 
to expand the natural gas industry, which could further secure its position as Asia’s trading 
hub over regional competitors. Furthermore, Singapore is on the right track by replacing 
petroleum with natural gas for electricity generation. Natural gas enhances energy security 
by reducing supply disruptions and enabling the government to meet current and future 
energy demands. 
The weaknesses in the hydrocarbon sector are mainly the lack of diversification 
away from fossil fuels resulting in high CO2 emissions, the weak climate target and 
absence of long-term goals related to hydrocarbon reduction, the low liquidity of LNG 
trading in Asia, and expensive cost of natural gas storage and transport. While most of 
these weaknesses are due to Singapore’s geographical limitations and lack of indigenous 
resources, there are ways to mitigate the impact of these weaknesses. For example, 
Singapore’s push for renewable sources of energy can increase the share of low-carbon 
non-fossil fuels in the energy mix. Nuclear energy can also reduce Singapore’s carbon 
footprint and reduce dependence on foreign reserves. As for the lack of commitment to 
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combatting climate change, Singapore can begin by revising its core energy policy 
documents and renewing its international pledges and targets to align national action with 
needed ambition. 
With regard to opportunities, Singapore may take advantage of global 
developments such as the rise of international LNG trade to enhance its hydrocarbon 
industry. Singapore can leverage its LNG technology and experience in oil trading to 
become Asia’s leading energy trading hub, helping Singapore pursue its ultimate ambition 
of sustained economic growth. The country’s sizable capacity for oil storage also presents 
an opportunity for developing the Asian spot market by attracting oil majors and 
independent trading houses to establish trading operations in Singapore. 
The threats that Singapore faces are the global increase in refined oil capacity and 
the decrease in the refined oil demand brought by shifting attitudes toward carbon-intense 
fuel sources. Likewise, there is the threat of oversupply of natural gas due to recent shale 
gas discoveries particularly in Australia and the United States. Moreover, natural gas 
infrastructures are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and foreign petroleum resources are 
subject to geopolitical conflict, social unrest, accidents in the Strait of Malacca, and natural 
disasters, all of which threaten Singapore’s continuity of supply and stability of fuel prices. 
These threats are largely beyond Singapore’s control, but certain mitigation 
measures can forestall such developments. For instance, Singapore should delay plans for 
new LNG projects or expansion to await better market conditions. Singapore-based gas 
importers should also draft shorter-term contracts to match demand fluctuations, which 
will also minimize the sunk costs absorbed from canceling LNG cargo load-out overseas. 
In the case of foreign supply disruptions, Singapore must identify alternative suppliers in 
various geographical locations to mitigate the disruption from a certain region. As to threats 
to safety and security, more can be done to improve ship-handling and maritime safety. For 
example, Singapore can tighten the security measures of the Singapore Navy and Coast 
Guard, as well as encourage more regional cooperation to enhance the safety and freedom 
of navigation through Southeast Asia’s most vital sea lanes. 
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III. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
In an attempt to reconcile the three competing ends of the energy trilemma, many 
nations have turned to nuclear energy for carbon-saving commitments, reliability of energy 
supply, and competitive fuel pricing. At present, there are 451 nuclear power reactors in 
operation around the world, generating about 10.6% of the world’s electricity supply.128 
In addition to this inventory, 58 nuclear power reactors are currently under construction 
worldwide, and 154 more are either on order or planned with funding and approvals.129 
Nuclear energy does well in the clean energy spectrum because the fission of 
uranium atoms produces zero carbon emissions. The splitting process emits heat which is 
then used to create steam for turning turbines and generating electricity. The Nuclear 
Energy Institute in Washington, D.C., describes the power of a single uranium atom as, 
“one uranium fuel pellet creates as much energy as one ton of coal, 149 gallons of oil or 
17,000 cubic feet of natural gas.”130 In terms of security of supply, nuclear energy does 
not depend on specific weather conditions or pipelines like other fuel sources.131 In 
addition, nuclear energy works 24/7 and therefore does not require back-up power 
generation.132 
In terms of pricing competitiveness, a combined study by the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded: 
At a 3% discount rate, nuclear is the lowest cost option for all countries. 
However, consistent with the fact that nuclear technologies are capital 
intensive relative to natural gas or coal, the cost of nuclear rises relatively 
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quickly as the discount rate is raised. As a result, at a 7% discount rate the 
median value of nuclear is close to the median value for coal, and at a 10% 
discount rate the median value for nuclear is higher than that of either 
CCGTs or coal.133 
To clarify, a 3% discount rate accounts for the “social cost of capital”; a 7% discount rate 
accounts for rates in restructured or de-regulated electricity markets; and a 10% discount 
rate accounts for investments in high-risk environments.134 As shown above, at lower 
discount rates, energy generated by nuclear power plants is the cheapest option for 
consumers. 
Given the benefits of nuclear energy and its solutions to the energy trilemma, why 
has Singapore not adopted nuclear technology in its energy landscape? Are there plans to 
incorporate nuclear power in the resource-constrained country? This chapter examines the 
four major issues concerning nuclear energy in Singapore: (1) economic, (2) 
environmental, (3) social, and (4) political. As in the previous chapter on hydrocarbons, 
this chapter concludes with a SWOT analysis of the nuclear energy sector to derive policy 
implications and offers recommendations toward Singapore’s nuclear future. 
B. AMBITIONS 
In an era of fluctuating oil prices and global climate change, nuclear energy has 
recently become a popular idea in Singapore’s energy industry. Although Singapore today 
has no nuclear power program, the government’s stand on the use of nuclear technology 
has shifted over the years. In 2007, the same year the first national energy policy was 
published, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong ruled out nuclear energy because land scarcity 
precluded Singapore from establishing the necessary 30 km safety radius around nuclear 
power plants.135 
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Three years later, the government conducted a pre-feasibility study on nuclear 
energy, signaling an effort to explore other avenues for overcoming the country’s energy 
constraints and enhance energy security.136 The study determined that “nuclear energy 
technologies presently available are not suitable for deployment in Singapore,” and that 
Singapore preferred to wait for “safer and more robust designs” before reconsidering its 
options.137 Interest in nuclear energy further waned after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
disaster in Japan, which triggered a global rethink of uranium fission as an energy 
source.138 
Singapore recognizes the need to understand nuclear science and technology 
despite the absence of concrete plans to build nuclear reactors. In 2013, Singapore 
approved a SGD$63 million fund to develop the Nuclear Safety Research and Education 
Program (NSREP).139 The program aims to build Singapore’s credibility in nuclear 
technology, conduct research, and evaluate the implications of emerging nuclear trends 
both regionally and globally. 
One component of the NSREP is the Singapore Nuclear Research and Safety 
Initiative (SNRSI), which aims to “concentrate expertise and knowledge in nuclear 
technology and safety in a single institute, and sustain a critical mass of manpower engaged 
in a range of nuclear-related activities relevant to Singapore.”140 To meet this goal, the 
SNRSI developed a three-fold strategy: (1) to recruit, educate, and establish a core of 
nuclear scientists and experts through programs in local and international universities; (2) 
to maintain nuclear research laboratories capable of providing technical support; and (3) to 
engage in regional and global cooperation to improve nuclear safety. By focusing on 
building technical capacity and expanding the knowledge base, Singapore is on track 
toward becoming a rational player in Southeast Asia’s nuclear future. 
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C. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
For a country where economic growth has historically taken center stage, the 
adoption of a new energy sub-sector requires extensive cost-benefit analysis to ensure 
economic progress is not compromised. The Singapore government has not conducted such 
an analysis, although a study conducted by the National University of Singapore (NUS) in 
2014 reveals: 
The levelized cost of electricity from recently built nuclear power plants in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea is 8.4 ¢/kWh, denominated in 2007 dollars, 
which is more cost effective compared to 2007 Singapore electricity tariff 
of 20.2 ¢/kWh. As both countries are comparable to Singapore in terms of 
labor, operation cost and technology advancement…it is cheaper to 
substitute oil and gas power generation [with] nuclear power.141 
This statement echoes the results published by the NEA and the IAEA on the projected 
costs of electricity generation as mentioned early in this chapter—that energy generated by 
nuclear power plants (not accounting for discount rates) is the cheapest option for 
consumers. 
It is important to note that both studies published by the NUS and the NEA-IAEA 
collaboration utilized the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) methodology. The LCOE 
accounts for the operation cycle and expected lifetimes of power plants, amortized over an 
assumed financial lifetime.142 But the two reports also recognize that the LCOE does not 
accurately reflect the true cost of nuclear power generation. The NUS study claims that 
additional costs incurred from the construction phase of nuclear power plants are often 
transferred to consumers in the form of increased electricity prices.143 The NEA-IAEA 
study adds, “the LCOE should be accompanied by other metrics when choosing among 
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electricity generation technologies.”144 This is because the LCOE methodology was based 
on regulated markets when, in reality, electricity markets may diverge from this origin.  
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) cautions against using simple 
metrics such as the LCOE for comparing costs across various technologies and fuels.145 
According to the EIA: 
Because LCOEs do not include contractual terms on price, duration, or price 
inflators, they should not be directly compared with other prices such as 
power purchase agreements. Power purchase agreements may involve 
project- or corporate-specific finance terms, reflect differing contract terms 
with the power purchaser, or reflect the value rather than the cost of the 
energy.146 
In addition, the LCOE methodology may not capture tax incentives and the effect of state 
or local programs, and it overlooks the differences in the operation of generating 
technologies.147 For example, some plants operate around the clock, while others only run 
during peak hours. Some power plants depend on wind and solar energy to operate, energy 
which may not be available continuously.148 Singapore must keep these caveats in mind 
when conducting its cost-benefit analysis of nuclear energy in the future. 
Another economic factor for consideration pertains to the carbon tax. In 2019, 
Singapore implemented the Carbon Pricing Act which imposes a SGD$5 carbon tax for 
every tonne of GHG emissions on industrial facilities, including power generating 
companies.149 This means that direct emitters will have to either cut down on fossil fuel 
consumption or become more energy efficient to avoid additional costs incurred from 
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carbon emissions. That the carbon tax increased the cost of electricity generated from coal, 
petroleum, and natural gas is one reason for nuclear energy to be added to Singapore’s 
arsenal. 
Lastly, the nuclear energy industry can stimulate Singapore’s economy. As an 
engine for job creation, the industry can create a “total lifetime employment [of] 200,000 
labour-years, or about 400 million labour-hours” for every “1,000MWe (net) advanced 
light water unit” and the statistics are expected to grow with increasing electricity 
demand.150 Another energy agency adds, “a single nuclear power plant creates more jobs 
than any other type of energy generation facility.”151 The nuclear energy industry employs 
workers from a wide range of expertise and educational backgrounds—from 
administrative, to operation and maintenance, to construction and supply chain, which can 
greatly enhance Singapore’s employment prospects. Similarly, Singapore may trade with 
its neighbors any excess energy from nuclear power plants for additional revenue. In sum, 
Singapore could witness a growth of its labor force and enjoy economic dividends should 
it adopt nuclear energy in its future energy mix. 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
One of the major appeals of nuclear energy is the perception that it is a clean source 
of energy. But this notion is misleading because studies have proven that nuclear energy 
releases carbon dioxide through “life cycle emissions.”152 These GHG emissions are 
products of the different phases of plant operation, such as construction, uranium mining 
and processing, and decommissioning. Figure 7 shows a comparison of the life cycle 
emissions of various sources of energy. While nuclear energy is shown as releasing 28 
tonnes CO2e/GWh, it is among the lowest of any electricity generation method, making it 
a better option compared to the carbon-intense sources of energy. 
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Figure 7. Life Cycle GHG Emissions Intensity of Various Electricity 
Generation Methods.153  
A second environmental concern regarding nuclear energy is that low levels of 
radiation are constantly being emitted to the atmosphere by operating power plants. Studies 
from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Switzerland have shown an increased 
risk of leukemia in children living in the vicinity of nuclear installations.154 Other diseases 
attributed to low-level radiation include thyroid and breast cancer, cardiovascular diseases, 
cataracts, perinatal mortality, and congenital defects.155 On the other hand, the effects of 
low-level radiation on plants and wildlife are widely debated. Some suggest that animal 
                                                 
153 Source: World Nuclear Association, “Comparison of Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of 
Various Electricity Generation Sources” (London, United Kingdom, July 2011), 7, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA/Publications/Working_Group_Reports/comparison_of_lifecycle.pdf. 
154 Gabriele Mraz and Oda Becker, “Health Effects of Ionising Radiation and Their Consideration in 
Radiation Protection” (Vienna, Austria: Wiener Umweltanwaltschaft/Vienna Ombuds-Office for 
Environmental Protection, 2017), 3, http://www.joint-
project.org/upload/file/Health_effects_and_radiation_protection_summary_2017.pdf. 
155 Mraz and Becker, 3–4. 
42 
and plant populations are unharmed at dose rates below 1 milligray per day.156 Others 
report significant impacts on wildlife from low-level dose rates.157 The lack of scientific 
consensus demands additional research on this topic to support future feasibility studies of 
nuclear energy industries. 
Finally, waste management is a huge concern for the industry because waste from 
nuclear power plants can have residual radioactivity that may last for hundreds of years. 
Each stage in the fuel cycle generates radioactive waste—from mining of raw materials, to 
uranium ore processing, to assembly of fuel rods, and treatment of the spent fuel from the 
reactor.158 Used fuel may be reprocessed to extract remaining uranium, a process that 
reduces the volume of high-level nuclear waste by about 85%.159 Unprocessed fuel and 
contaminated steel components are either recycled within the industry or buried 
underground to minimize the impact on the environment. Referred to as “geological 
disposal,” this process involves packaging the nuclear waste inside engineered barriers and 
storing the containers inside a rock volume underground to prevent radioactivity from 
reaching the surface and to allow natural radioactive decay.160 
Singapore’s geographic restrictions have prompted concerns as to whether it can 
handle the amount of nuclear waste.161 But Palmer et al. argue that radioactive waste 
storage should not be a burden to Singapore, citing that the British nuclear power program 
generated high-level nuclear waste equivalent to only “one standard-size basketball court 
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to just below the baskets” in its 50 years of operating 41 nuclear power plants.162 A small 
nation-state like Singapore will not require 41 nuclear power plants to provide electricity 
to its population, which means any waste generated will be within manageable levels. 
E. SOCIAL FACTORS 
From a social perspective, there is general opposition to nuclear energy in 
Singapore due to the risk of nuclear accidents. Most of these fears are borne out of the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima incidents, as many Singaporeans expressed concern that 
accidents still occur despite established safety precautions.163 Another misgiving pertains 
to threats of sabotage and the weaponization of nuclear energy. Some Singaporeans were 
concerned about the risks of nuclear terrorism and many believed that nuclear energy can 
be exploited and turned into weapons of mass destruction.164  
Despite the lack of public support toward nuclear energy, some Singaporeans 
reluctantly accept the technology under the premise of commercial benefits, survival 
should Singapore deplete its traditional energy sources, and the perception that ordinary 
citizens do not possess the ability to oppose the government’s decisions.165 Among the 
many concerns, some experts wonder how the public’s conditional acceptance of nuclear 
energy can transform into genuine approval. Ho et al. describe that “negative sentiments 
toward nuclear energy were attributed to the lack of nuclear-related expertise and 
technological capabilities to ensure nuclear safety currently…their support for nuclear 
energy were largely contingent on Singapore’s nuclear-related capabilities.”166 Given 
these reasons, Singapore’s policymakers can begin with educating the public and 
addressing myths surrounding nuclear energy. The establishment of the SNRSI as 
Singapore’s official nuclear institution is a step in the right direction. The SNRSI’s 
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authority, trustworthiness, and expertise in nuclear energy will help convey factual 
information, dispel misconceptions and allay public concerns, thus setting the scene for 
Singapore’s future nuclear energy industry. 
F. POLITICAL FACTORS 
None of the countries in Southeast Asia currently has an operating nuclear power 
plant, although notable progress has been made in terms of program development in 
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.167 While a country’s technical, financial, and 
institutional capacities play a significant role in the advancement of nuclear energy 
programs, regional relationships also factor into the success of such projects. Regional 
cooperation is necessary for the following reasons: (1) a nuclear contamination knows no 
borders; (2) a single nuclear accident can easily disrupt the region’s fastest-growing 
economies; (3) the region’s vital sea lanes are not tightly guarded by maritime security 
forces, risking the safe transport of radioactive materials.168 It is therefore in the region’s 
interest to collectively ensure nuclear security, safety and standards. 
In 2018, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) released an official 
report on the establishment of nuclear power plants in the region for the medium- to long-
term period.169 The report calculates that the first civilian-operated nuclear reactor in the 
region could be ready by 2030. Although regional conditions still need to be in place for 
the realization of the endeavor, Putra and Andrews-Speed claim, “the report itself is an 
indication that the ASEAN member states are working together and are open and 
transparent about their aspirations and state of nuclear power infrastructure development, 
which augurs well for the region.”170 
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The report identifies Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines 
as the frontrunners in the region’s nuclear energy industry due to their “more advanced 
legal and regulatory frameworks, nuclear energy infrastructures, and developed 
organization and human resources.”171 In contrast, Singapore’s commitment to nuclear 
energy has been limited to the development of its knowledge base in the areas of nuclear 
safety and science. However, Singapore has the potential to assume a leadership role in the 
nuclear energy subsector, given its affluent economy and strategic location in the Strait of 
Malacca. In particular, Singapore can take the lead in improving the maritime security of 
the region’s most vital sea lanes to prevent illicit trafficking, sabotage, and an inadvertent 
movement of radioactive and fissile materials. 
G. FINDINGS 
Singapore does not have firm projections for when it will start building nuclear power 
facilities, but it is not ruling out nuclear energy in its future energy landscape. The strengths 
of Singapore’s nuclear energy initiatives are mainly the government’s allocation of 
significant resources through the NSREP to develop the country’s nuclear knowledge base; 
the establishment of the SNRSI as Singapore’s official institution to take the lead in nuclear-
related matters and convey factual information to the public; and the implementation of the 
carbon tax that makes nuclear energy a more economically viable option. Singapore is also 
not expected to generate an unmanageable level of nuclear waste which eases the country’s 
land scarcity dilemma. 
As to weaknesses, the main critique is that the public has been hesitant in 
welcoming nuclear energy development. Ideally, public acceptance of national policies is 
necessary for a strategy to succeed; however, Singapore’s style of democracy seems to 
discourage progress in this arena. Thus, progress toward social acceptance of nuclear 
power is contingent on whether Singapore can effectively educate and engage its citizens—
an opportunity best reserved for the SNRSI, the organization which ultimately possesses 
the nuclear credibility to allay the concerns of the people. The lack of a cost-benefit analysis 
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beyond the LCOE methodology is another weakness for Singapore and is therefore a great 
starting point for pushing nuclear development. 
Other opportunities in Singapore’s nuclear energy initiatives include the potential 
growth of its labor force and the possible economic dividends should the country decide to 
export its surplus nuclear energy to the regional electrical grid. The nuclear energy sector 
could also provide a venue for regional cooperation, beginning with Singapore taking the 
leading role in improving maritime security in Southeast Asia’s most vital sea lanes. The 
nuclear energy industry demands a secure maritime environment to prevent illicit 
trafficking, sabotage, and the inadvertent movement of radioactive and fissile materials, 
and Singapore can influence regional safety given its strategic location in the Strait of 
Malacca. 
Singapore faces the same threats as any other nation with a nuclear power program. 
These threats include low-level radiation exposure, risk of nuclear accidents, and nuclear 
terrorism and weaponization. As with the chapter on hydrocarbons, certain mitigation 
measures can forestall such incidents. For example, Singapore can reduce the population’s 
exposure to low-level radiation by building nuclear reactors that adhere to the safety radius 
established by the IAEA. Given the country’s land constraints, feasible locations include 
an underground nuclear power station or a floating platform out to sea.172 Nuclear 
accidents can be mitigated through robust designs, containment, continuous training, 
regulatory oversight, periodic safety assessments, and a myriad of other ways dictated by 
international nuclear organizations. Regarding the threat of terrorism and weaponization 
of nuclear energy, Singapore should lead by improving the maritime security in the region, 
as discussed above. 
The next chapter discusses the renewable energy subsector, which has seen a 
growing contribution to Singapore’s energy landscape. Unlike nuclear energy still in the 
research and development phase, Singapore has adopted renewable energy from solar 
photovoltaics and biofuels. The government is taking advantage of more renewable energy 
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options as it manages the three competing ends of the energy trilemma, while keeping in 
mind the intermittency challenges posed by these energy sources. 
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IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
Renewable energy refers to energy that is obtained from inexhaustible resources 
such as biofuels, hydropower, geothermal, wind, and solar.173 Until the beginning of the 
21st century, renewable sources of energy had only been the advocacy of environmental 
groups. Today, interest in the renewable energy sector has expanded to governments, 
businesses, and consumers, owing in part to the universal consciousness brought by climate 
change, resource scarcity, and rising energy prices.174 In addition, advancements in 
technology have contributed to the global acceptance of renewables. Renewables have 
become much more financially viable from production to deployment, owing to research 
and development (R&D) activities sponsored by various government and corporate 
partnerships worldwide.175 
The main appeal of renewable energy is in its environmental benefits, particularly 
the absence of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from these fuel sources. However, Quek 
et al. contend that “while renewable energy systems are less pollutive in general than fossil 
fuels at their point of use, environmental impacts can be high at other stages in the life 
cycle of the system.”176 They conclude, “switching to renewable energy sources does not 
necessarily reduce environmental impacts…each energy source requires a unique mix of 
resource inputs and uses a different technology, which damages the environment in a 
different way.”177 This statement mirrors the life cycle emissions graph presented in 
Figure 7 of Chapter III. No form of energy is truly “clean” because GHGs are emitted at 
different phases of plant operation.  
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Considering the impact of life cycle emissions, increasing the use of renewable 
energy in Singapore thus seems to achieve little in terms of environmental sustainability. 
But in terms of energy security and energy equity, the renewable energy industry is an 
effective way to manage the energy trilemma. On one hand, renewables enhance energy 
security by promoting fuel diversification, reducing supply risks, and enabling the 
government to meet current and future energy demands. On the other hand, renewables 
improve energy equity by making energy accessible and affordable across the population. 
Most of all, the renewable energy industry promises economic growth through increased 
foreign investments and job opportunities. These facts are further discussed in this chapter. 
Singapore’s renewable energy options are limited to solar, biomass, and biogas due 
to its geographic constraints. The government identifies these limitations as follows: (1) 
average wind speed in Singapore is 2 meters per second (m/s), making commercial wind 
turbines which operate at 4.5 m/s an infeasible option; (2) tidal power generation is limited 
due to the country’s narrow tidal range, calm seas, and the use of sea space for ports and 
shipping lanes; (3) Singapore does not have a fast-flowing river system which could 
harness hydroelectric power; and (4) Singapore does not have geothermal energy 
sources.178 Therefore, this chapter excludes a discussion on hydropower, geothermal, and 
wind energy due to their zero potential contribution to meeting Singapore’s energy 
demands. 
Singapore is not, however, without viable renewable energy options. Solar energy 
is power generated by the sun that is converted into thermal or electrical energy. One way 
to harness solar energy is through photovoltaic (PV) devices that are semiconductors found 
in solar panels that convert photons into electrical current.179 Located near the equator, 
Singapore receives annual solar irradiation of 1,500 kilowatt-hours per square meter, which 
makes solar PV a viable renewable energy option.180 
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Similarly, biomass and biogas—both derived from living matter—are options 
available for consideration. Singapore’s biomass component includes wood waste, 
agricultural waste, food waste, and paper, all of which are sent to waste-to-energy (WTE) 
plants or cogeneration plants for incineration to produce energy.181 Similarly, biogas is 
derived from organic material, but these waste products undergo anaerobic digestion, a 
biological mechanism involving the decomposition of organic material without the use of 
oxygen.182 This decomposition produces methane and carbon dioxide, which is then 
converted into heat and electricity. Although Singapore’s renewable energy options are 
limited, innovations in the solar, biomass, and biogas industries seem promising in 
responding to the country’s energy demands. 
B. AMBITIONS 
Singapore’s venture into renewable energy began in April 2006 after it acceded to 
the Kyoto Protocol, a treaty that aimed to reduce GHG emissions from industrialized 
nations.183 As part of its renewable energy plan, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) 
recommended that renewable energy should supply 5% of Singapore’s peak electricity 
demand by 2020.184 In 2019, Singapore’s peak demand was 7,217 MWp.185 This means 
that around 360 MWp must be supplied by renewable energy sources to meet the MTI’s 
goals. 
The National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS), the agency in charge of 
coordinating Singapore’s domestic and international policies related to climate change, 
turned the MTI’s recommendation into concrete goals by aiming to provide 350 MWp of 
electricity to consumers using solar PV by 2020.186 By the end of the second quarter of 
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2019, Singapore’s grid-connected solar capacity was at 262.4 MWp.187 Figure 8 shows a 
sharp increase in solar capacity from 2012 to 2019, indicating that the government is on 
track to meet its 2020 target. Consequently, the NCCS foresees that by 2030, up to 8% of 
electricity requirements could be supplied by renewable energy given the country’s R&D 
capabilities and an influx of foreign investments. 
 
Figure 8. Installed Capacity of Solar Photovoltaic Systems, 2012–2019.188 
Singapore’s biofuels industry is less established than its solar counterpart. Although 
the MTI announced a proposal in 2007 to integrate biofuels into Singapore’s energy 
landscape, Ng believes that the plan collapsed due to “rising feedstock cost, poor 
economics, uncertain demand outlook, and controversy over the ethics of using food crops 
for fuel production and its role in the destruction of rainforests in Indonesia and 
Malaysia.”189 Specifically, Ng points out that the ethics of using food crops to generate 
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fuel became controversial when food and grain prices inflated from 2007 to 2008, harming 
low-income families around the world. Furthermore, the energy industry could not predict 
when biofuels would become profitable. For instance, Neste Oil could not give a timeline 
on when its biodiesel sales volumes would increase significantly, and instead the company 
ran into financial difficulty when the prices of palm oil-based biodiesel tripled in 2008.190 
Despite the failure to fully integrate biofuels in Singapore’s energy landscape, the 
country currently has four operational WTE plants capable of processing 8,200 tonnes of solid 
waste per day.191 The heat from incineration is then used to generate steam for turning 
turbines, producing electricity that meets up to 3% of Singapore’s consumer demand. This 
contribution is but a small fraction of Singapore’s energy mix. Nonetheless, the input of 
biomass and biogas cannot be neglected because as R&D advances and technology develops, 
“energy sources which are not feasible for Singapore today may become viable in the 
future.”192 
C. SOLAR ENERGY 
One initial challenge to solar deployment is the high upfront cost of PV systems. 
However, technological advancements and increases in production capacity have reduced 
these costs over time, resulting in payback periods as short as 7 to 10 years.193 Figure 9 
illustrates that project size, cheaper PV panels, and lower installation costs influence the 
shorter payback periods that make solar energy an attractive investment. Although a simple 
payback method is used in this calculation, many investors are comfortable with this 
benchmark because a break-even point of 6 to 8 years on assets with a lifespan of 25 to 30 
years is viewed as a worthy venture.194  
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Figure 9. Payback Periods of Solar Photovoltaic Systems.195 
Solar energy has also become financially viable due to its low risk and low 
maintenance costs. Most manufacturers provide 25-year warranties for their solar panels, 
which also means a 90% performance guarantee of rated power at 10 years and 80% 
performance guarantee at 25 years.196 Moreover, solar panels do not demand extensive 
maintenance due to the absence of moving parts, and, generally, only require cleaning and 
inspection two to three times per year.197 In the long run, a combination of the accelerated 
payback, long-term warranties, and modest maintenance fees alleviate the high upfront 
costs of PV systems. 
Singapore also encourages households to send surplus energy generated by solar 
electric systems back to the power grid for profit, where payment is made to the user’s 
electricity bill through monthly credits.198 In this way, the consumer lowers his utility bill, 
becomes a producer of energy, and reduces his dependence on national energy resources. 
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Another cost advantage of solar energy pertains to reducing peak demand. The Energy 
Market Authority (EMA) notes, “peak energy usage in Singapore—typically in the 
afternoons—coincides with the periods when there is the greatest output of solar energy. 
Lowering peak demand can potentially reduce electricity pool prices and bring system-
wide benefits.”199 In other words, the more consumers tap onto their residential solar 
electric supply, the less they rely on the national energy grid, a scenario which lowers peak 
power demand and the cost of electricity. 
The large-scale deployment of solar energy comes with a few limitations. First, 
solar energy is weather-dependent and poses the problem of intermittency.200 For instance, 
despite its tropical location, Singapore’s urban shading and high cloud cover affect the 
amount of solar radiation that reaches any given location. Likewise, the intensity of 
incident sunlight fluctuates within a 24-hour period and is subject to seasonal variations.201 
Sivaneasan et al. contend, “the intermittency problem of solar PV generation, typically in 
the range of minutes, will become very significant in Singapore as the installations of PV 
systems continue to increase.”202 Ultimately, the problem of intermittency exacerbates 
supply and demand imbalance, and therefore complicates solar energy deployment. 
To adapt to the intermittency and instability of solar energy, Singapore launched its 
smart grid project called Intelligent Energy System (IES) in 2009.203 A smart grid 
enhances conventional electricity grid security, reliability, and facilitates the integration of 
renewable energy resources using two-way digital communications between producers and 
consumers. One aspect of the IES is the system’s ability to respond to erratic electricity 
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supply and demand flows.204 When solar radiation is insufficient or when consumer 
demand is too high, the IES initiates load shedding or intentional blackouts to stabilize the 
grid. The system also tracks the location and extent of electrical outages, which enables it 
to respond promptly to restore power supply.205 Figure 10 provides a conceptual overview 
of the IES program. In addition to enabling intermittent energy sources to connect to the 
grid, the IES encourages active consumer participation in network operations by providing 
them with information, choice, and control over their use of electricity. 
 
Figure 10. Intelligent Energy System Conceptual Overview.206 
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Another constraint for renewable energy in Singapore is that land scarcity and high 
population density limit the amount of available surface area for solar PV installation.207 
As one of the most heavily populated cities in the world, Singapore needs approximately 
6,400 hectares of land to support an estimated population boom of 5.5 million.208 Land is 
a finite resource, and although Singapore has had success in its land reclamation projects, 
competing demands from residential housings, businesses, recreation, educational 
institutions, public works, etc., continue to threaten land availability for the energy 
industry. 
Nonetheless, Singapore remains proactive in developing innovative ways to 
incorporate solar technology into the urban environment. One initiative is the installation 
of solar panels on the rooftops of residential buildings; Singapore’s largest housing 
developer estimates that about 10,000 residential blocks can be utilized for solar 
generation.209 Government buildings have also been retrofitted with solar PV systems as 
part of the SolarNova program launched in 2014.210  
Moreover, the Solar Energy Institute of Singapore is exploring the use of building-
integrated photovoltaics (BIPV), which integrate solar modules into the building structure 
to generate electricity.211 BIPVs can be installed on curved surfaces, windows, balconies, 
or facades; BIPVs can also be colored or transparent to satisfy the building’s aesthetics. 
The institute is also tapping the potential of Singapore’s water reservoirs to install solar 
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farms. With 17 water reservoirs servicing the island, there is a possibility of adding a few 
hundred megawatts of power to Singapore’s energy pool.212 
Last but not least, Singapore is developing a plan to outsource solar energy from 
Australia, a project which will transmit electrical power via 3,800 kilometers of undersea 
cable.213 The project is expected to deliver three gigawatts of power, equivalent to one- 
fifth of Singapore’s electricity supply. When complete, the undersea power line will be the 
longest in the world, surpassing by five times the 720 km power cable that connects 
Norway and the United Kingdom.214 David Griffin, the chief executive of the company 
behind the project, estimates that the venture will be complete by 2027.215 All of these 
developments in Singapore’s solar energy industry feature the country’s wealth of 
technology, research expertise, and skilled workers and technicians. These will help further 
the country’s energy and economic goals, despite the apparent limitations brought by 
geography and lack of indigenous resources. 
D. BIOFUELS 
Singapore has a well-developed waste collection and disposal industry. The 
government has adopted a four-part strategy for sustainable waste management which 
involves: (1) reduce and reuse, (2) recycle, (3) waste treatment, and (4) landfill and ash 
management.216 After waste is segregated and recyclables are sorted, the remaining waste 
is sent to WTE plants for treatment and incineration. This process enables the efficient 
recovery of energy as biofuels, which also minimizes the use of landfill space. Ash and 
non-incinerable wastes are then sent to Pulau Semakau, an off-shore landfill for final 
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disposal.217 Consequently, the total waste volume will have already been reduced by 90% 
by the time the ash residue reaches Pulau.  
Singapore’s total solid waste in 2018 reached 7.7 million tonnes and from these, 
about 350,000 tonnes generated by wood and horticulture were sent to biomass power 
plants for conversion to fuel.218 Table 3 shows the 2018 composition of waste in 
Singapore, highlighting waste that was recovered for conversion to biomass and biogas, 
which is equivalent to about 3% of the country’s energy needs.  
Table 3. Waste Composition in Singapore, 2018.219 
 
Note: Biomass feedstock is highlighted in red. Biogas feedstock is highlighted in blue. 
 
Previous analyses have shown that, the amount of waste generated in Singapore is 
insufficient for biogas production and is unlikely to meet the country’s energy demands.220 
These studies indicate that Singapore would have to import a significant amount of biomass 
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218 National Environment Agency of Singapore, “Waste Statistics and Overall Recycling,” accessed 
April 4, 2020, https://www.nea.gov.sg/our-services/waste-management/waste-statistics-and-overall-
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219 Source: National Environment Agency of Singapore, “Waste Statistics and Overall Recycling.” 
220 Quek et al., “Challenges in Environmental Sustainability of Renewable Energy Options in 
Singapore,” 392. 
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waste to meet 97% of the population’s electricity needs, which is equivalent to about 158–
357 million tonnes of waste annually. This is an impractical option for a country with 
limited land and a dense population. At best, the maximum contribution of biomass and 
biogas to Singapore’s electricity mix is 5.1%.221 
Chicken manure is another locally available waste that is being utilized to produce 
biogas. Through anaerobic treatment, methane is recovered from chicken waste, which is 
then used for electricity generation. This electricity powers the farm’s infrastructure, 
allowing it to be self-sufficient and sustainable, and resulting in energy savings costs of 
approximately SGD$60,000 per month.222 Singapore has three chicken farms that continue 
to expand operations to minimize dependence on poultry imports. Collectively, the farms 
are expected to generate 150,000 tonnes of annual organic waste by 2025, equivalent to 
approximately 50 Gigawatt-hours of electricity which could sustain farm operations.223 
Although the biofuels industry did not take off as it was envisioned in 2007, 
Singapore remains enthusiastic that its current bio-renewable projects will contribute to the 
energy security, sustainability, and equity that the country needs. For example, as seen in 
Table 4, the country continues to operate a few biomass and biogas power plants, with 
more under contract for development. The ongoing operation of these power plants 
indicates that the setbacks to the biofuels industry as mentioned earlier have not deterred 
Singapore from supporting the penetration of biofuels in its energy landscape. 
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Table 4. Biomass and Biogas Power Plant Status in Singapore.224 
 
 
As to the financial viability of biofuels, the Sustainable Energy Association of 
Singapore (SEAS) estimates a 16% to 22% internal rate of return from the industry.225 The 
SEAS also cautions that biofuels may have steeper financing costs compared to the solar 
alternative as a result of feedstock supply issues. Nonetheless, one potential solution to 
reduce these costs is by co-locating biofuel power plants at material recovery facilities.226 
Biogas from chicken manure is instructive—by producing, processing, and utilizing waste 
on-site, the cost of purchasing raw materials is eliminated, ultimately resulting in lower 
capital costs. For example, Figure 11 shows a farm-site blueprint that has its biogas power 
                                                 
224 Source: Sustainable Energy Association of Singapore, “Accelerating Renewable Energy in 
Singapore,” 18. 
225 Sustainable Energy Association of Singapore, 25. 
226 Sustainable Energy Association of Singapore, 26. 
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plant in proximity to the waste recovery and treatment plants, a layout which helped the 
company reduce its transmission and distribution costs. 
 
Figure 11. Lim Chu Kang Farm-Site Layout.227 
Beyond the potential return on investment of energy recovered from waste products 
are other non-financial benefits worth consideration. According to SEAS: 
Since a biomass co-generation plant is like a mini-power plant involving 
almost all disciplines of engineering and with high degree of automation, 
investments into these projects will create rewarding employment for 
PMETs [professionals, managers, executives, and technicians]. Singapore 
can build up a talent pool in the bio-energy sector.228 
                                                 
227 Source: Heng, “Bio Gas Plant Green Energy from Poultry Wastes in Singapore,” 437. 
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Likewise, Singapore’s Minister for the Environment and Water Resources estimates that 
the industry is expected to generate about 1,000 jobs in the next five years and around 2.2 
million jobs by 2030 for the region.229 
In addition, the zero-waste approach of biofuel power plants will help control 
Singapore’s urban problems such as the expanding landfill dilemma. WTE systems greatly 
reduce the amount of municipal waste that are transported to landfills, maximizing waste 
yard capacity in the land-scarce country.230 To some extent, the cost reductions associated 
with waste transportation and efficient use of landfills offer another side benefit. Finally, 
Singapore’s biofuel industry game plan “can be exported to other countries (such as China, 
ASEAN and India) where there is abundant biomass waste and a great need for electricity, 
thermal heat and air-conditioning.”231 This initiative could be an opportunity for Singapore 
to showcase its knowledge and expertise in the energy industry despite its geography and 
resource constraints. 
E. FINDINGS 
Similar to the previous chapters on hydrocarbons and nuclear energy, Singapore’s 
renewable energy industry is evaluated using a SWOT analysis to derive policy 
implications and to recommend avenues for improving future performance. The SWOT 
analysis of the renewable energy framework is as follows: 
One strength of the renewable energy industry is the promotion of energy 
diversification which ultimately reduces supply risks, particularly for a country that relies 
heavily on imports. Second, it makes energy more accessible and affordable by enabling 
the consumers to become producers of solar energy with the ability to sell the surplus back 
to the grid. In addition, renewable energy technology has grown more viable over the past 
few decades due to technological innovation and investments in R&D. Most importantly, 
the government has set clear, actionable, and measurable goals regarding the future of solar 
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energy, a detail that has been lacking in the policy documents of the other energy 
subsectors. One recommendation, however, is for Singapore to impose mandatory 
regulations for retailers to source a percentage of total electricity sales from renewable 
energy supplies based on a fixed timeline.232 In this way, Singapore can increase its uptake 
of renewable energy and reduce its dependency on fossil fuels. 
The weaknesses of the renewable energy industry are mainly due to the limitations 
brought by Singapore’s geography. Especially for solar energy, problems of intermittency 
compromise electrical grid stability. Land shortage also constrains solar PV deployment. 
Nevertheless, Singapore makes a conscious effort to manage these geographic 
disadvantages. For example, the smart grid project upgrades electricity delivery systems 
through digital communication, which allows rapid response to fluctuating energy supply 
and demand. In this way, power plants can promptly intervene to ensure an uninterrupted 
power supply. Next, land scarcity is mitigated by utilizing all available surfaces for solar 
PV installation, such as the roofs and facades of residential and government buildings, 
water reservoirs. More remarkably, Singapore is exploring the use of trans-oceanic subsea 
cables to import solar energy from Australia. 
With regard to opportunities, Singapore could utilize its wealth of technology, 
research expertise, skilled workers and technicians to secure the country’s position as 
Asia’s leading clean technology hub. Next, the industry could broaden opportunities for 
economic growth by attracting foreign investors and increasing employment for the PMET 
labor group. Through the biofuels industry, Singapore could also fully realize its zero-
waste ambitions and maximize its landfill usage. Lastly, the renewable energy industry 
could be an avenue for promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR). One focus of CSR 
is incorporating sustainable development into a company’s business strategy.233 
Renewable energy can help reduce a company’s carbon footprint, setting the bar for 
responsible social norms and benefitting the company and society in general. 
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Threats to the renewable energy landscape include the risks involved with feedstock 
supply to generate biofuels. In the first place, Singapore’s insufficient biomass waste 
means that the government would have to consider importing waste from outside the 
country to generate significant amounts of energy. There are also transmission and 
distribution costs associated with feedstock supply, increasing the capital costs associated 
with operating bio-renewable power plants. Nonetheless, Singapore attempts to ease these 
expenses by co-locating biofuel power plants with material recovery facilities.234 Thus far, 
Singapore’s poultry farms have adopted this concept and have seen financial gains. 
It is unrealistic to import a million tonnes of biomass waste when there is a shortage 
of land options, but it should not be a limitation to pursue renewable energy goals. 
According to SEAS, Singapore can do two things: first, introduce “acceptable standards 
for biomass power plants such as minimum system efficiencies to fully recover the inherent 
energy from limited biomass fuel” and second, “allow other industrial waste to be used as 
supplementary fuel to the power plants to enhance energy efficiency and reduce the 
quantity of biomass required.”235 With collaboration among the government, private 
sector, and research institutes, Singapore can find innovative solutions to its urban and 
energy problems.  
Up to this point, this thesis has discussed the history, policies, and outlook 
regarding Singapore’s three energy subsectors and how each is enabling the country to 
manage the three competing ends of energy security, economic equity, and environmental 
sustainability. The final chapter synthesizes the findings of this research and provides final 
recommendations to help Singapore shape its future energy policies. 
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The Singapore economic experience is one of the most impressive stories of 
poverty to plenty. From a sleepy fishing village during the pre-British Empire era, the 
country now ranks among the richest economies in the world, owing to structural reforms 
and political-economic choices made by the government following its independence from 
British rule. By the same token, the energy industry has contributed greatly to Singapore’s 
meteoric economic growth, a remarkable achievement considering the country’s lack of 
indigenous energy resources. Unfortunately, the pursuit of economic growth through the 
energy industry involves trade-offs in the areas of energy security and environmental 
sustainability. Energy independence is not a one-dimensional end state—the process 
involves carefully managing the three competing ends of what is known as the energy 
trilemma. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, while Singapore has consistently performed well 
over the past few decades in the realms of energy equity and environmental sustainability, 
the country has struggled with energy security due to its heavy reliance on imported fuel 
sources. Singapore imports most of its energy from Malaysia and Indonesia, a situation 
that makes the country vulnerable to a number of supply and price risks such as geopolitical 
conflict, social unrest, accidents, and natural disasters. Nonetheless, Singapore strives to 
expand its domestic energy production and enhance its energy independence through the 
three energy subsectors of hydrocarbons, nuclear energy, and renewable resources. 
Equally important, Singapore simultaneously addresses the demand side of the 
problem. The government has made strides in efficiency by liberalizing the electricity 
market, which in turn encourages the prudent use of energy resources. In addition, 
Singapore has adopted the use of more efficient technology—from CCGTs and solar PVs, 
to optimizing the design of buildings and vehicles, to the introduction of smart grid systems 
and the implementation of the carbon tax. Altogether, these efforts in efficiency help reduce 
energy usage and eliminate energy wastage, while delivering the same level of service to 
the population. 
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This thesis concludes by returning to the research questions posed in Chapter I. 
First, in what way is Singapore’s current energy strategy helping the country achieve 
greater energy security? Second, how might Singapore modify its energy policy given that 
international competition for energy sources has intensified? To the first question, our 
findings suggest that Singapore need not possess a large endowment of domestic energy 
resources to improve its energy security. Singapore approaches energy security through 
partnerships with international players to expand its energy access, as demonstrated by the 
country’s venture into liquefied natural gas that has opened the country to a variety of fuel 
sources beyond Asia. Similarly, Singapore’s international partnerships make the import of 
renewable energy feasible, as illustrated by the plans to source solar energy from Australia. 
Furthermore, Singapore’s cooperation with ASEAN member states in terms of advancing 
the region’s nuclear energy infrastructure indicates a strong commitment toward greater 
energy security.   
The findings also reveal the importance of Singapore’s whole-of-government 
approach in pursuing energy security. This is a necessary strategy because the energy 
trilemma is an indivisible issue that must be confronted as a system rather than as 
independent components. The whole-of-government approach facilitates the sharing of 
objectives across organizational boundaries, which results in an integrated government 
response to the country’s energy issues. Of note, the coordinated and consistent support 
across multiple agencies for solar energy has produced coherent policies, aggressive R&D 
investments, and actionable and measurable goals, which have made the renewable energy 
industry a much more viable option now compared to the last few decades. 
Although Singapore does not have formal plans for the nuclear power industry at 
the moment, it does not rule out nuclear energy in its future energy landscape. In fact, the 
government has allocated significant resources to develop the country’s nuclear knowledge 
base. In the same way, Singapore continues to support the biofuels sector despite its initial 
difficulty in penetrating the energy landscape. These two examples emphasize that 
technical innovation and perseverance are Singapore’s strongest characteristics which help 
bridge the gap between energy deficiency and energy independence. 
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With regard to the increasingly competitive international energy environment, 
Singapore need not take drastic measures to modify its current energy framework. Instead, 
Singapore should focus on managing its foreign relations, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally. As Henry Kissinger points out, “to a certain extent the new ‘great game’ has 
already begun. Access to energy today [is] not only a purely economic but also political 
problem. As long as resources are limited and demand is still increasing, consumerist 
countries should come to an agreement before the competition leads to serious 
tensions.”236 In other words, a nation’s survival in a world of heightened energy demands 
will depend on positive relations between countries that participate in the global energy 
system.  
The world has become much more complex due to globalization, which means that 
if Singapore’s economy were to falter due to lack of energy, other countries could also feel 
the negative impact of this downturn. In an interconnected and increasingly competitive 
world, energy security will thus depend on the ability of nations to cooperate to ensure that 
each is able to find the resources it needs to survive. While it is natural for countries to seek 
what is best for their own security, unilateral measures must be replaced with multilateral 
strategies if true energy security is to be attained. Global linkages have made nationalistic 
conceptions of energy security irrelevant. To this end, Singapore’s leaders must quickly 
recognize that the concept of energy security is evolving. This means that now is the time 
to shift Singapore’s ideals from energy independence to energy interdependence. 
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